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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
                     
 
 
 
STAPLETON, Circuit Judge: 
 
 
 This appeal requires us to consider the situation of a 
criminal defendant whose lawyers make a tactical decision not to 
raise federal due process objections in the defendant's state 
trial or on state direct appeal, and do so under circumstances in 
which they could have a good faith expectation that the defendant 
would be able to raise these federal objections in state 
collateral review proceedings.  The issue we address is whether 
the rule of Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963), bars such a 
defendant from later raising his federal objections in federal 
4 
court through a petition for writ of habeas corpus.  We hold that 
it does not. 
5 
I. 
 In 1976, George Lee Reynolds was tried for felony 
murder, conspiracy, and robbery in the Superior Court of the 
State of Delaware.  His alleged role in the crimes was to drive 
his two codefendants to and from the scene of the murder and 
robbery.  The prosecuting Deputy Attorney General, in his opening 
statement to the jury, referred extensively to two purported 
confessions Reynolds had made to the police.  Later in the trial, 
when the prosecution sought to introduce Reynolds' confessions 
into evidence, a hearing was held to determine their 
admissibility.  At the hearing, the prosecution withdrew its 
proffer of the confessions.  The prosecution never renewed its 
proffer,0 and the evidence it did present turned out to be weak.0 
After the prosecution withdrew its proffer of Reynolds' 
confessions, Reynolds' counsel did not request a curative jury 
instruction regarding the Deputy Attorney General's opening 
statement, nor did Reynolds' counsel ask that a mistrial be 
declared.  Reynolds was convicted and sentenced to life in 
prison. 
                                                           
0In the separate trial of one of Reynolds' codefendants, the 
Delaware judge excluded Reynolds' confessions as unreliable 
because the police had induced them by making promises of freedom 
and a monetary reward to Reynolds that were "extravagant in the 
extreme."  State of Delaware v. Rooks, 411 A.2d 316, 316 (Del. 
1980); see also, State v. Rooks, 401 A.2d 943 (Del. 1979).  After 
excluding Reynolds' confessions, the judge directed a verdict of 
acquittal for Reynolds' codefendant. 
0See, e.g., Reynolds v. Ellingsworth, 843 F.2d 712, 716 n.10 (3d 
Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 960 (1988) ("Reynolds I") 
(state's case was "weak"). 
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 Following a direct appeal to the Delaware Supreme 
Court, a remand by the supreme court to the trial court for 
further hearings in light of newly discovered evidence (at which 
hearings the chief investigating police officer appeared as a 
defense witness), and a second direct appeal to the supreme 
court, the supreme court affirmed Reynolds' conviction.  Reynolds 
v. State, 424 A.2d 6 (Del. 1980).  In none of these proceedings 
did Reynolds' counsel complain that Reynolds' federal rights had 
been violated at trial. 
 Reynolds then sought state collateral review of his 
conviction pursuant to Delaware Superior Court Criminal Rule 35.0 
In that proceeding, he complained for the first time that the 
prosecutor's references to the confessions during his opening 
statement, coupled with the trial judge's failure to give a 
limiting jury instruction or to declare a mistrial sua sponte, 
denied Reynolds the due process required by the federal 
Constitution. 
 In the Rule 35 proceedings, the Delaware Superior Court 
held hearings to determine why Reynolds' lawyers had not raised 
his federal claims either at trial or on direct appeal. Reynolds' 
two trial lawyers, one of whom also represented Reynolds on 
direct appeal, testified at the hearings.  Both said they had no 
                                                           
0Delaware Superior Court Criminal Rule 35(a) provides: 
 
 (a) Correction of Sentence.  The court 
may correct an illegal sentence at any time 
and may correct a sentence imposed in an 
illegal manner within the time provided 
herein for the reduction of sentence. 
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recollection, independent of the transcript they were supplied, 
that the Deputy Attorney General had mentioned Reynolds' 
confessions to the jury.  Moreover, both testified that they did 
not remember why they had not requested a limiting instruction, 
moved for a mistrial, or complained on direct appeal about the 
prosecutor's statements.  Each counsel did offer hypothetical 
explanations, based largely upon his usual practices and his 
review of the record, as to why, for tactical reasons, he might 
have conducted Reynolds' trial and/or direct appeal as he did.   
 Reynolds' lead trial lawyer, an experienced criminal 
defense attorney who made most of the tactical trial decisions, 
offered three reconstructive hypotheses as to why he might not 
have moved for a mistrial.  The first hypothesis was that he did 
not want a mistrial because it would give the prosecution a 
second opportunity to proffer the confessions after having 
marshalled stronger evidence to support their admissibility.  The 
second was that a motion for a mistrial might have prompted the 
prosecutor to ask for a recess and rethink his decision to 
withdraw the confessions.  The third hypothesis was that defense 
counsel simply overlooked the issue -- in his words, "I didn't 
catch it," or "I blew it."  Appendix at 368 and 364.  When asked 
which hypothesis he "placed the most reliance on," Reynolds' lead 
trial counsel answered, "Intellectually, the first.  Emotionally, 
the third."  Appendix at 368.  While denying any recollection on 
the subject, lead counsel also hypothesized that he did not ask 
for any cautionary instruction because it would serve primarily 
to refocus the jury's attention on the confessions. 
8 
 The defense counsel who handled the direct appeal gave 
the following testimony as to why the matter of the confessions 
had not been raised on appeal: 
 The reason it was not raised on appeal 
was because, as far as I am concerned, the 
better grounds for appeal were the 
interpretation of the stipulation regarding 
the truth serum and also the very good ground 
of the newly-discovered evidence when we had 
the investigating officer saying he believed 
the wrong man had been convicted. 
Appendix at 382.   
 The superior court analyzed the testimony of Reynolds' 
counsel to ascertain whether Reynolds had shown "cause" for his 
failure to raise his due process claims at trial or on direct 
appeal.  The superior court performed this analysis because it 
interpreted the Delaware Supreme Court's opinion in Conyers v. 
State, 422 A.2d 345 (Del. 1980), to impose a contemporaneous-
objection requirement for preserving Rule 35 review, and to adopt 
the United States Supreme Court's Wainwright v. Sykes "cause and 
prejudice" test as the Delaware standard for deciding whether to 
impose a procedural bar for failure to comply with the 
contemporaneous-objection requirement.  State v. Reynolds, Nos. 
76-04-0026; 0027; 0027A, letter op. at 2-3 (Del. Super. Ct. Dec. 
9, 1983).  In Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977), the United States 
Supreme Court held that a state criminal defendant forfeits the 
availability of federal habeas review if his lawyer fails to 
raise his federal claim at the time or in the manner specified by 
"independent and adequate" state procedural requirements unless 
9 
the defendant can show "cause" for his counsel's state default 
and "prejudice" resulting from it. 
 The superior court held that Reynolds had failed to 
show "cause" for his trial and appellate lawyers' silence 
regarding his federal due process claims, and therefore ruled 
that Conyers barred Reynolds from raising the claims in state 
collateral review proceedings.  State v. Reynolds, Nos. 76-04-
0026; 0027; 0027A, letter op. at 7 (Del. Super. Ct. Dec. 9, 
1983).  The Delaware Supreme Court upheld the superior court's 
decision.  Reynolds v. State, No. 370 1983, letter op. (Del.  
Jan. 16, 1985). 
 Reynolds filed pro se a second Rule 35 motion raising 
federal constitutional claims of ineffective assistance of 
counsel.  The superior court denied Reynolds' second Rule 35 
motion as repetitive.  State v. Reynolds, No. IS76-04-0026, 0027, 
letter op. at 2 (Del. Super. Ct. Mar. 12, 1986).  Reynolds did 
not appeal.  Reynolds I, 843 F.2d at 723. 
 Reynolds later filed a pro se petition for a writ of 
habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the 
District of Delaware pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.  His petition 
raised both unfair trial and ineffective assistance of counsel 
claims.  The unfair trial claims were based on the prosecutor's 
reference to Reynolds' confessions and the failure of the trial 
judge sua sponte to instruct the jury to disregard that 
reference.  The district court referred the case to a magistrate 
judge who recommended that Reynolds' unfair trial claims be 
barred from habeas review under the "cause and prejudice" or 
10 
"independent and adequate state ground" test of Wainwright v. 
Sykes, supra.  The magistrate judge recommended that Reynolds' 
ineffective assistance claims be rejected on their merits.  The 
district court adopted the magistrate's recommendations, and 
denied Reynolds' habeas petition.  Reynolds I, 843 F.2d at 716. 
 Reynolds appealed the district court's dismissal of his 
habeas petition.  We reversed the district court's ruling that 
Reynolds' unfair trial claims were procedurally barred.  The 
Delaware courts' determination that Reynolds had forfeited his 
opportunity for Rule 35 review, we concluded, was not based on an 
independent and adequate state procedural ground of default as 
required by Sykes.  Reynolds I, 843 F.2d at 719.  Essentially, we 
found that the Delaware courts had subjected Reynolds to a new 
contemporaneous-objection requirement when they reviewed his Rule 
35 motion, a requirement which had not existed at the time 
Reynolds could have contemporaneously objected.0  While the 
                                                           
0See Reynolds I, 843 F.2d at 719: 
 
To decide whether Conyers provides an 
"independent and adequate" basis for 
precluding federal habeas review of 
Reynolds's claims, we turn to the three 
factors upon which the Supreme Court relied 
to so decide in Sykes, to wit: whether the 
state procedural requirement is stated in 
"unmistakable terms," whether the state 
courts have refused to review the claims on 
the merits, and whether the state courts' 
refusal in this instance is "consistent" with 
other state decisions.  Id. at 85-86, 97 S. 
Ct. at 2505-06. 
 
 Notwithstanding the Delaware courts' 
refusal to consider the merits of Reynolds's 
claims, we find that the Conyers decision 
11 
Delaware courts might be free to impose a surprise forfeiture 
rule to preclude state collateral review of a state trial's 
compliance with federal law, we held that state forfeiture-by-
surprise was an inadequate ground for precluding federal 
collateral review.  We also found that Reynolds had not exhausted 
his available state remedies regarding his ineffective assistance 
claims.  Accordingly, we reversed the district court's 
disposition of both Reynolds' unfair trial claims and his 
ineffective assistance claims.  We remanded for further 
proceedings consistent with our opinion.  In our opinion, we 
noted that, if Reynolds chose to amend his petition to drop his 
unexhausted ineffective assistance claims, the district court 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
does not constitute an "independent and 
adequate state procedural ground" barring 
federal courts from habeas review of the due 
process claim raised here.  No specific 
Delaware procedural rule governs, in 
"unmistakable terms," Sykes, 433 U.S. at 85, 
97 S. Ct. at 2505, the precise claim raised 
in Reynolds's Rule 35 motion, namely, that 
due process was denied by the prosecutor's 
over-reaching coupled with the absence of the 
judge's sua sponte limiting instruction or 
declaration of mistrial.  In addition, the 
Delaware courts' invocation of Conyers is not 
consistent with other state authority.  Thus, 
of the three elements that could support a 
conclusion that this state procedural 
requirement is "adequate" to preclude federal 
review, two are blatantly missing here. 
 
See also id. at 720 ("Whether enunciated by court rule or case 
law, there is no Delaware procedural rule on point, and therefore 
Reynolds violated none."); id. at 722 ("Even if we were to 
conclude that a new Delaware procedural rule was created by 
Conyers, we could not also conclude that the rule barred 
collateral federal review, where it was applied to claims [like 
Reynolds' claims] for the first time in the instant case."). 
12 
"could then proceed to the merits" of Reynolds' unfair trial 
claims.  Reynolds I, 843 F.2d at 724 n.22. 
 On remand, Reynolds dropped his ineffective assistance 
claims, and the district court once again referred his unfair 
trial claims to a magistrate judge.  This time the magistrate 
judge considered the merits of Reynolds' unfair trial claims, and 
recommended that the claims be dismissed.  Reynolds v. 
Ellingsworth, No. 86-142-JRR, 1992 WL 404453, at *6 (D. Del.  
Dec. 31, 1992).  The district court, however, decided once again 
that it was barred from considering the merits of Reynolds' 
unfair trial claims.  This time the district court ruled that 
Reynolds' habeas petition was barred under the "deliberate 
bypass" rule of Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1962), a rule we had 
no occasion to address directly in Reynolds I.   
 The district court interpreted Fay to require that 
Reynolds' federal due process claims be barred from federal 
habeas review if, for strategic reasons, Reynolds' counsel 
deliberately bypassed the opportunity to object at trial and on 
appeal to the Deputy Attorney General's opening statements and 
the trial court's failure to give a curative instruction.  
Applying 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), the district court ruled that it 
was bound by what it characterized as the Delaware Superior 
Court's "factual determination that Reynolds' counsel 
intentionally decided not to object or move for a mistrial."  
Reynolds v. Ellingsworth, No. 86-142-JRR, 1992 WL 404453, at *8 
(D. Del. Dec. 31, 1992).  Therefore, the district court held, 
"because of his counsel's intentional decision to forgo objection 
13 
to the prosecution's opening statement, Reynolds is precluded 
from mounting a due process challenge to the effect of the 
statement upon the fairness of his trial."  Id. at *9. 
 Reynolds now appeals the district court's second 
refusal to consider the merits of his due process claims.   
 
II. 
 Our legal analysis is premised on two threshold 
assumptions, one legal and the other factual.  First, we assume 
that Fay v. Noia has survived Sykes, supra, and Coleman v. 
Thompson, 111 S. Ct. 2546 (1991).  Second, we assume that 
Reynolds' counsel made strategic decisions not to move for a 
mistrial or ask for a curative instruction.   
 There is substantial support for the view that the 
"independent and adequate state law ground" rule, as applied in 
cases like Sykes, Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478 (1986), and 
Coleman v. Thompson, 111 S. Ct. 2546 (1991), has subsumed the 
"deliberate bypass" rule of Fay.0  If Fay is currently without 
                                                           
0In creating and applying the "cause and prejudice" standard in 
Sykes and Carrier, the Supreme Court "limited Fay to its facts."  
Coleman, 111 S. Ct. at 2563, 2564.  In Coleman, the Supreme Court 
went further, stating: 
 
 In Harris [v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255 
(1989)], we described in broad terms the 
application of the cause and prejudice 
standard, hinting strongly that Fay had been 
superseded . . . . 
 
 We now make it explicit: In all cases in 
which a state prisoner has defaulted his 
federal claims in state court pursuant to an 
independent and adequate state procedural 
14 
independent significance, of course, the judgment of the district 
court cannot be upheld in light of our holding in Reynolds I. 
Since we conclude that Reynolds' petition would merit review 
under Fay as well as Sykes, and that a reversal is required even 
if Fay retains independent vitality, we will assume arguendo that 
the district court properly looked to Fay as a relevant 
precedent. 
 With respect to the factual predicate for our decision, 
we note, again, that the purpose of the evidentiary hearing in 
the superior court in the first Rule 35 proceeding was to 
determine whether Reynolds could show "cause" and "prejudice" 
under Conyers and Sykes.  Reynolds maintained in that proceeding 
that the ineffective assistance of his counsel with respect to 
the confession references provided "cause" under Conyers and 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
rule, federal habeas review of the claims is 
barred unless the petitioner can demonstrate 
cause for the default and actual prejudice as 
a result of the alleged violation of federal 
law, or demonstrate that failure to consider 
the claims will result in a fundamental 
miscarriage of justice.  Fay was based on a 
conception of federal/state relations that 
undervalued the importance of state 
procedural rules.   
 
* * *  
 
. . . By applying the cause and prejudice 
standard uniformly to all independent and 
adequate state procedural defaults, we 
eliminate the irrational distinction between 
Fay and the rule of cases like Francis[v. 
Henderson, 425 U.S. 536 (1976)], Sykes, 
Engle[v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107 (1982)], and 
Carrier. 
111 S. Ct. at 2564-65. 
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Sykes to excuse his failure to make a contemporaneous objection. 
The superior court held that Reynolds had not satisfied his 
burden of proof on the cause issue and characterized the record 
as reflecting a situation like that involved in Engle v. Isaac, 
456 U.S. 107 (1982), a case in which the Supreme Court held that 
neither a deliberate strategic decision nor an inadvertent 
failure of counsel to raise an issue constitute "cause" unless 
counsel's performance has failed to meet the Sixth Amendment 
standard for competent assistance, 456 U.S. at 133-34; see also 
Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. at 485-87.  The superior court cast 
its holding as follows:   
 
Defendant contends that the reason for the 
failure of his attorneys to raise the issue 
at trial or at the appeal stage was either 
inadvertence or lack of knowledge of the 
applicable law.  I do not find that those 
contentions have been proved by this record. 
 
 4.  Considering the experience and 
competence of defendant's attorneys and the 
quality of the defense made in this case, I 
find that the situation here falls squarely 
within the language of Engle that "[c]ounsel 
might have overlooked or chosen to admit 
[omit] respondents' due process argument 
while pursuing other avenues of defense". 
Under the reasoning of Engle the situation 
existing here does not constitute cause 
justifying relief from the failure to make 
timely objection. 
State v. Reynolds, Nos. 76-04-0026; 0027; 0027A, letter op. at  
6-7 (Del. Super. Ct. Dec. 9, 1983). 
 In the course of his opinion, the superior court judge 
also described the testimony of defense counsel that we have 
16 
summarized above.  That description included the following 
observations: 
It is clear from the testimony of the 
defendant's attorneys that they viewed the 
announcement of the Deputy Attorney General 
that he would not seek to introduce the 
confession in evidence as a substantial 
victory and that they desired to push forward 
to conclude the trial because they then 
anticipated a verdict in defendant's favor. 
Defendant's lead trial counsel testified that 
he did not seek an admonition from the Court 
for the jury to disregard the Deputy Attorney 
General's prior reference to the confession 
because it would only focus attention on the 
prior references.  With reference to his not 
seeking a mistrial, he testified that he had 
had no recollection of his mental processes. 
However, he testified, based upon his 
experience, that after two or three days of 
trial a jury forgets what was said in an 
opening statement.  . . . Defendant's other 
attorney . . . testified that . . . he felt 
that raising [the prosecutor's reference to 
the confessions] would detract from the more 
meritorious arguments which were the thrust 
of the appeal.   
 
State v. Reynolds, Nos. 76-04-0026; 0027; 0027A, letter op. at  
5-6 (Del. Super. Ct. Dec. 9, 1983).   
 Both the Supreme Court of Delaware and the district 
court read the superior court's opinion as finding that Reynolds' 
counsel made deliberate strategic decisions not to ask for a jury 
instruction or a mistrial.  The district court regarded this 
factual finding as supported by the evidence and therefore 
binding upon it under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 
 We have no difficulty in concluding that the evidence 
before the superior court would have supported a factual finding 
that strategic decisions were made.  That hypothesis would seem 
17 
to be the most reasonable one given the general quality of 
counsel's trial performance and the fact that it would appear to 
have been in Reynolds' best interest not to seek a mistrial.  In 
that way, he could see what the jury would do with the state's 
weak evidence and, if he was convicted, the then existing 
Delaware law did not appear to foreclose him from raising his due 
process objections later.  If counsel deliberately chose this 
course, it would clearly have been permissible trial strategy not 
to resurrect the state's opening by asking for a curative 
instruction.    
 While we are thus confident that the evidence before 
the Superior Court would support a factual finding of strategic 
decision making, we are less confident about the district court's 
holding that it was required by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) to presume 
that such decision making occurred.  Before the presumption 
provided in Section 2254(d) arises, it must appear that "the 
merits of the factual dispute [in the district court] were 
resolved in the State Court hearing."  28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). 
While the issue found crucial by the district court was whether 
deliberate strategic decisions were made, the holding of the 
superior court was that Reynolds' counsel either overlooked the 
issue or made a strategic decision, neither of which would 
constitute cause under Conyers and Sykes.  While we acknowledge 
that there is language in the superior court's opinion from which 
it can be inferred that it believed strategic decisions were 
made, the superior court's statement of its ultimate conclusion 
18 
and its focus on the Conyers cause issue make the district 
court's approach to the Fay v. Noia issue problematic. 
 Nevertheless, we will assume, consistent with the 
district court's approach, that Reynolds' counsel made strategic 
decisions not to request a mistrial and not to ask for a curative 
instruction.   We do so because our present task -- reviewing the 
district court's refusal to reach the merits of Reynolds' due 
process arguments -- does not require us to determine whether or 
not such decisions were made.0  We may assume arguendo that 
strategic decisions were made because the district court's 
refusal was inappropriate even if strategic decisions were made. 
 While we thus accept that Reynolds' counsel made 
strategic decisions not to move for a mistrial and not to ask for 
an instruction, we emphasize before proceeding with our legal 
analysis that neither the superior court nor any other court has 
found that Reynolds' counsel made a strategic decision to forego 
state process in order to seek federal habeas corpus relief.  Nor 
is there any reason to infer such an intent.  As we pointed out 
in Reynolds I, Reynolds' counsel at the time of trial had no 
reason to anticipate that the failure to ask for a mistrial or a 
jury instruction (or even the failure to raise the confession 
issue on direct appeal) would bar consideration of Reynolds' due 
                                                           
0Because the district court on remand will be required to reach 
the merits of Reynolds' unfair trial due process claims, and 
because Reynolds has withdrawn his constitutionally ineffective 
assistance claims, we do not foresee that the district court will 
again be required to decide whether the superior court "resolved" 
the "strategic decision" issue within the meaning of § 2254(d)(1) 
and we express no opinion on that issue. 
19 
process claims in a state post-conviction relief proceeding under 
Rule 35. 
III. 
 In Fay v. Noia, Noia, the petitioner, claimed that he 
had been convicted on the basis of a coerced confession in 
violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.  He had not 
appealed his conviction, however, and he was subsequently denied 
state post-conviction relief because of this failure to appeal. 
The Supreme Court held that he was entitled to federal habeas 
review of his contention that he was being confined in violation 
of the federal Constitution. 
 The Court in Fay viewed its task as determining "the 
proper accommodation of [the] great constitutional privilege [of 
habeas review] and the requirements of the federal system."  372 
U.S. at 426.  It reaffirmed the power of a federal habeas court 
to grant relief from unconstitutional state confinement where 
state courts have rejected or refused to consider the 
petitioner's constitutional argument.  The limitations which it 
recognized on the appropriate exercise of that power were 
grounded in federalism and the necessity of comity between the 
federal and state court systems. 
 The Court noted the exhaustion doctrine codified in 28 
U.S.C. § 2254, observing that "it would be unseemly in our dual 
system of government for a federal district court to upset a 
state court conviction without an opportunity to the state courts 
to correct a constitutional violation."  Id. at 419-20, quoting 
from Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200, 204 (1950).  The Fay court 
20 
held, however, that the exhaustion doctrine of § 2254 barred 
federal review only when there were state remedies still 
available to the petitioner at the time of his petition.  372 
U.S. at 434-35. 
 The Fay court also held that the "independent and 
adequate state ground" doctrine that barred direct review by the 
Supreme Court of state judgments having a basis in state law 
should not be applied to bar habeas review in federal district 
courts.  Thus, the fact that a habeas petitioner had violated a 
state procedural rule and was thereby barred from further state 
review of a federal constitutional issue did not alone foreclose 
federal habeas relief.  372 U.S. at 428-34. 
 The Fay court nevertheless did recognize that there 
were situations not covered by the exhaustion doctrine in which 
the "exigencies of federalism" counselled against federal habeas 
review: 
[T]he exigencies of federalism warrant a 
limitation whereby the federal judge has 
discretion to deny relief to one who has 
deliberately sought to subvert or evade the 
orderly adjudication of his federal defenses 
in the state courts. 
 
                 * * *  
 
We therefore hold that the federal habeas 
judge may in his discretion deny relief to an 
applicant who has deliberately bypassed the 
orderly procedures of the state court and in 
doing so has forfeited his state remedies. 
 
372 U.S. at 433, 438 (emphasis supplied). 
 The Fay court's conclusion with regard to the 
"independent and adequate state ground" doctrine was subsequently 
21 
abandoned in Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977), because it 
was "based on a conception of federal/state relations that 
undervalues the importance of state procedural rules."  Coleman 
v. Thompson, 111 S. Ct. 2546, 2565 (1991).  Where state review of 
a federal claim is barred because of a habeas petitioner's 
noncompliance with a state procedural requirement, comity 
counsels that the independent and adequate state ground doctrine 
be applied to bar collateral access to the federal courts in the 
absence of a showing of "cause and prejudice." 
Just as in those cases in which a state 
prisoner fails to exhaust state remedies, a 
habeas petitioner who has failed to meet the 
State's procedural requirements for 
presenting his federal claims has deprived 
the state courts of an opportunity to address 
those claims in the first instance. . . . The 
independent and adequate state ground 
doctrine ensures that the States' interest in 
correcting their own mistakes is respected in 
all federal habeas cases. 
Coleman, 111 S. Ct. at 2555. 
 With this background, we turn to the "deliberate 
bypass" doctrine articulated in Fay.  It is this doctrine that 
was applied by the district court to bar Reynolds' access to the 
federal courts after we had determined that such access was not 
barred by the independent and adequate state ground doctrine. The 
important point for present purposes is that, like the doctrines 
of exhaustion and independent and adequate state ground, the 
deliberate bypass doctrine finds its justification in comity 
concerns.  A petitioner should not be able to secure federal 
relief if he has deliberately deprived the state judicial system 
of an opportunity to correct the alleged constitutional error.  
22 
As articulated by the Supreme Court in Fay, the deliberate bypass 
doctrine is a waiver doctrine.  "The classic definition of waiver 
. . . -- 'an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known 
right or privilege' -- furnishes the controlling standard."  372 
U.S. at 439.  The doctrine applied only when the "habeas 
applicant . . . understandingly and knowingly forewent the 
privilege of seeking vindication of his federal claims in the 
state courts."  Id.   
 Fay's rationale for the deliberate bypass doctrine is 
inapplicable to the facts of this case.  Reynolds did not 
understandingly and knowingly forego the privilege of seeking to 
vindicate his federal claims in the Delaware courts, nor have his 
counsel been found to have made a decision to bypass state 
process for federal.  Accordingly, he cannot be said to have 
deprived the Delaware courts of the opportunity to pass on his 
constitutional contention.  On the contrary, Reynolds tried to 
raise his federal claims in Delaware Superior Court and in the 
Delaware Supreme Court pursuant to Delaware's collateral review 
procedures.  If his trial and appellate counsel made a strategic 
decision to bypass state trial and appellate procedures, it was 
on the basis of a state legal landscape in which they could go 
forward in the hope of an acquittal by the jury and raise the due 
process argument in a Rule 35 proceeding.   
 Because Reynolds' counsel could not have anticipated 
that their failure to raise the federal due process claims at 
trial and on direct review would prevent Reynolds from raising 
the claims in state collateral review proceedings, they could not 
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have deliberately forfeited Reynolds' chance at state review of 
his federal claims.  And, "if neither the state legislature nor 
the state courts indicate that a federal constitutional claim is 
barred by some state procedural rule, a federal court implies no 
disrespect for the State by entertaining the claim."  County 
Court v. Allen, 442 U.S. at 154. 
 The most helpful Supreme Court precedent in this 
context is Lefkowitz v. Newsome, 420 U.S. 283 (1975).  Newsome, 
the petitioner there, pleaded guilty in a New York state court to 
possessing heroin.  He subsequently sought federal habeas review 
of the constitutionality of the search of his person that 
disclosed the heroin.  The respondent argued that, as a matter of 
federal habeas corpus law, a defendant who pleads guilty to an 
offense in a state court waives his right to federal habeas 
corpus review of any constitutional issues other than those 
involving the plea itself.  The Supreme Court recognized that 
this was the general rule and explained the rule by reference to 
the deliberate bypass doctrine of Fay: 
A defendant who chooses to plead guilty 
rather than go to trial in effect 
deliberately refuses to present his federal 
claims to the state court in the first 
instance.  McMann v. Richardson, supra, at 
768.  Once the defendant chooses to bypass 
the orderly procedure for litigating his 
constitutional claims in order to take the 
benefits, if any, of a plea of guilty, the 
State acquires a legitimate expectation of 
finality in the conviction thereby obtained. 
Cf. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 438. 
 The Supreme Court refused to apply the deliberate 
bypass rule in Newsome's case, however, because New York law 
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allowed a defendant to plead guilty and ascertain what sentence 
he would receive and thereafter pursue all of his constitutional 
claims in the state appellate process.  The Supreme Court held 
that, where a state voluntarily chooses not to give a conviction 
based on a guilty plea the normal preclusive effect in its own 
courts, there is no federal justification for denying federal 
habeas review of federal constitutional issues.0  So long as the 
petitioner has complied with the procedure required by state law, 
                                                           
0In the name of federalism, the dissent insists that concern for 
a "State's interest in the finality of its criminal judgments" 
(Dis. typescript op. at 6) justifies a federal rule precluding 
federal habeas review even in the absence of a state procedural 
default.  Lefkowitz, as we read it, teaches that federalism 
requires federal courts to permit a state to determine how 
"final" its own judgments will be.  New York had there decided 
that a New York criminal judgment based on a guilty plea would 
not preclude a subsequent challenge in the New York courts on 
constitutional grounds.  The respondent urged a federal rule that 
would give greater finality to New York criminal judgments in 
federal habeas courts than New York had chosen to give its 
criminal judgments in its own courts.  The Supreme Court rejected 
this suggestion, holding that judgments based on guilty pleas 
should be given the same degree of finality in federal habeas 
courts as the state entering the judgment would give it. 
 
 Because all human institutions are fallible, no 
judicial system of which we are aware has chosen to insist on 
absolute finality.  Each judicial system strikes a balance 
between the stability concerns served by judgments that preclude 
further proceedings and the justice concerns served by rules 
permitting alleged injustices to be reviewed after judgment is 
entered.  A state's position with respect to the necessity for 
contemporaneous objections necessarily reflects its judgment 
about how these conflicting concerns should be reconciled.  The 
creation of a federal contemporary objection rule in this case, 
as urged by the dissent, would give Reynolds' criminal judgment 
greater finality in a federal habeas court than Delaware had 
chosen to give its judgments in its own courts at the time of 
Reynolds' trial.  We believe this would be inconsistent with the 
federalism concerns of Fay and Lefkowitz. 
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his deliberate decision to avail himself of the benefits of 
pleading guilty should not bar federal review. 
 The Supreme Court stressed in Lefkowitz that applying 
the respondent's rule "would make New York's law a trap for the 
unwary" because defendants could understandably believe they had 
the option of availing themselves of the benefits of a guilty 
plea while preserving their right to appellate review of their 
constitutional issues and might only later discover that they had 
inadvertently waived their right to federal habeas review. 
 We read Lefkowitz to hold that Fay's deliberate bypass 
doctrine is based on comity and that it does not bar federal 
habeas review in the absence of a procedural default under state 
law.  Lefkowitz's teaching for this case seems clear to us.  Just 
as New York law afforded state appellate review despite a guilty 
plea, Delaware law afforded state habeas review despite the 
absence of a contemporary objection.  Since Reynolds, like 
Newsome, complied with the procedural requirements of the courts 
of his state and provided them with an opportunity to pass on his 
constitutional claim, he, like Newsome, cannot be said to have 
engaged in a deliberate bypass of state process.  To hold 
otherwise would fashion from Delaware law no less of a "trap for 
the unwary" than a contrary result in Lefkowitz would have 
fashioned from New York law.0 
                                                           
0Four years after Lefkowitz, in County Court of Ulster County v. 
Allen, 442 U.S. 140 (1979), the Supreme Court considered the case 
of three habeas petitioners who complained that they had 
been convicted of firearms possession in state court on the basis 
of an unconstitutional state evidentiary presumption.  Only after 
they had been convicted did the petitioners raise the federal 
26 
 We believe Lefkowitz's reading of Fay is inconsistent 
with the interpretation which the Court of Appeals for the 
Seventh Circuit has given to the deliberate bypass doctrine.  In 
Brownstein v. Director of Illinois Dep't of Corrections, 760 F.2d 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
issue in state court. In the ensuing federal habeas proceeding, 
the respondent argued that review was precluded by the deliberate 
bypass doctrine.  Id. at 146.  The Supreme Court ruled that the 
petitioners were entitled to federal habeas recourse because the 
state had never adopted a clearly applicable contemporaneous-
objection policy.  Id. at 150.  The Court expressed no concern 
that the petitioners' failure to raise their federal objection 
until after the jury's verdict was announced might actually have 
been a "deliberate" or "strategic" decision by the petitioners. 
It saw comity as the sole relevant issue and rejected the 
respondent's position because "if neither the state legislature 
nor the state courts indicate that a federal constitutional claim 
is barred by some state procedural rule, a federal court implies 
no disrespect for the State by entertaining the claim."  Id. at 
154. 
 
 In Lefkowitz and Ulster County, state appellate courts 
had addressed the petitioners' federal claims on their merits. 
This does not distinguish Lefkowitz and Ulster County from this 
case, however.  Under the federal habeas law we applied in 
Reynolds I, where a respondent urges that there has been a 
procedural default, the claim must be treated as one involving no 
procedural default if, inter alia, (1) the state procedural 
requirement has not been enunciated in "unmistakable terms," (2) 
the state courts have not insisted on that requirement in 
petitioner's case and have reached the merits, or (3) the state 
courts have insisted on the requirements in petitioner's case but 
in doing so have acted in a manner inconsistent with other state 
cases.  See footnote 4, supra.  In cases where there has been no 
procedural default, or any alleged default that may have occurred 
does not meet these three criteria, there is no independent and 
adequate state law ground for the judgment.  The absence of an 
independent and adequate state law ground in Reynolds' case is 
precisely the reason we permitted his habeas petition to go 
forward in Reynolds I, and it is what makes his situation 
equivalent to that of the petitioners in Lefkowitz and Ulster 
County. 
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836 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 858 (1985), the court 
held that federal habeas review is barred, even in the absence of 
a procedural default by the petitioner under state law, where the 
petitioner engaged in "strategic behavior" in the state court. 
Id. at 841.  In that case, the state trial judge had neglected to 
secure an express waiver of the petitioner's right to a jury 
trial prior to the petitioner's bench trial.  The petitioner 
candidly admitted during his federal habeas hearing that he was 
aware during his trial both of his right to a jury and of the 
fact that his trial judge was committing reversible error by 
failing to secure an express waiver.  He did not object, however, 
because his counsel believed he could "use the judge's omission 
to secure a new trial, should he lose the first time around." Id. 
at 839.  Under Illinois law, no objection was required to 
preserve this specific issue, and a new trial was mandated even 
if no prejudice was shown. 
 The Brownstein court began by quoting Fay's holding: 
"The federal habeas judge may in his discretion deny relief to an 
applicant who has deliberately by-passed the orderly procedure of 
the state courts and in doing so has forfeited his state court 
remedies."  Id. at 839.  It seems to us that the court then 
proceeded to ignore this holding, finding that the petitioner was 
barred from federal habeas review under Fay by his "strategic 
behavior," even though he had neither "by-passed the orderly 
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procedure of the state courts" nor "forfeited his state 
remedies."0   We respectfully decline to follow suit.   
 We have found no Supreme Court case and no Court of 
Appeals case other than Brownstein that recognizes or gives 
content to the concept of "strategic behavior" outside the 
context of a state procedural default.0  Moreover, we think it 
                                                           
0We perceive some irony in the fact that Brownstein finds a 
"strategic behavior" bar implicit in Fay.  In Fay, it will be 
recalled, the state procedural default was a failure to assert 
the coerced confession claim in a direct appeal.  Noia made a 
deliberate decision not to appeal in part because he had not 
received a death sentence and feared he might receive one if 
convicted after a new trial.  Only fourteen years later, after 
the state's ability to retry him in the absence of the confession 
had been impaired, did he seek collateral relief, first from the 
state and then from the federal court.  The Supreme Court 
recognized that Noia had obtained a benefit from his procedural 
default. His strategic behavior was of no moment, however, 
because "[u]nder no reasonable view can the State's version of 
Noia's reason for not appealing support an inference of 
deliberate by-passing of the state court system."  372 U.S. at 
439 (emphasis supplied). 
0All but one of the habeas cases the district court cited as 
authority for refusing to entertain Reynolds' habeas petition 
involved bars to federal habeas review premised on state 
procedural default, forfeiture rules which the defendants and/or 
their counsel were or should have been aware of, or, 
equivalently, a petitioner's deliberate abandonment of state 
recourse in favor of collateral federal review.  See Reed v. 
Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 8 & n.5, 10 (1984) ("Under North Carolina law, 
exceptions to jury instructions must be made after trial if they 
are to be preserved for appellate review, and errors that could 
have been raised on appeal may not be raised for the first time 
in postconviction proceedings."); Wainwright v. Sykes, 43 U.S. at 
76 n.5 (Florida Rule Crim. Proc. 3.190(i) imposed a 
"contemporaneous objection rule"); Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 
443, 445, 448 & n.3 (1965) (petitioner failed to comply with a 
Mississippi contemporaneous-objection requirement; procedural 
defaults in state proceedings do not prevent vindication of 
federal rights in federal court except "where state rule is a 
reasonable one and clearly announced to defendant and counsel"); 
Beaty v. Patton, 700 F.2d 110 (3d Cir. 1983) (rather than 
petition Pennsylvania Supreme Court for allocatur, defendant 
petitioned federal court for writ of habeas corpus); United 
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would be unwise and unfair to impose upon defense counsel the 
burden of determining, on pain of having waived their clients' 
right to federal habeas review, not only whether each tactical 
trial choice is permissible under state law but also whether it 
may ultimately be considered by a federal court to constitute 
"strategic behavior."   
 Finally, we believe application of the Seventh 
Circuit's "strategic behavior" concept to bar federal habeas 
review in this case would do by way of federal law precisely what 
we said in Reynolds I Delaware could not do by way of state law  
-- bar federal habeas review through the creation and retroactive 
application of a contemporaneous objection rule Reynolds' counsel 
had no reason to anticipate.  Clearly, the Supreme Court could 
impose a "strategic behavior" restriction on access to federal 
habeas review as the dissent suggests.  We do not believe it has 
done so, however.  Further, having determined, as we recognized 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
States ex rel. Abdul-Sabur v. Cuyler, 653 F.2d 828 (3d Cir. 
1981), aff'g 486 F. Supp. 1141, 1162 & n.31 (E.D. Pa. 1980) 
(Becker, Dist. J.) ("classic example of waiver"; "under 
Pennsylvania law, contemporary-objection is required to preserve 
an issue for appeal"), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1088 (1981); Green 
v. Rundle, 452 F.2d 232, 236-37 (3d Cir. 1971) (under 
Pennsylvania law, motions to sever multiple indictments and 
motions regarding jury instructions must be made on timely 
basis). 
 
 The final habeas case relied upon by the district court 
is Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501 (1976), which we understand 
to have granted habeas review and to have addressed the merits of 
the petitioner's claim.  Estelle ruled that, because the 
petitioner had not asked to wear civilian clothing during his 
state trial, the state could not have "compelled" him to be tried 
in prison clothing in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.  425 
U.S. at 512-13. 
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in Reynolds I, that states may not bar federal habeas review 
under the independent and adequate state ground doctrine of Sykes 
by unfairly applying a new contemporaneous objection rule 
retroactively, we doubt that the Supreme Court would see fit to 
create and retroactively apply a contemporaneous objection rule 
of its own.0 
 
                                                           
0Cf. Ford v. Georgia, 111 S. Ct. 850, 858 (1991) (retroactively 
applied state procedural-default rule not adequate to preclude 
direct review by U.S. Supreme Court of equal protection attack on 
state court judgment). 
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IV. 
 The judgment of the district court will be reversed, 
and this proceeding will be remanded to the district court for 
consideration of the merits of Reynolds' petition.                
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George L. Reynolds v. Jack C. Ellingsworth, Warden; 
Charles M. Oberly, III, No. 93-7106 
 
SLOVITER, Chief Judge, dissenting. 
 Last term in Brecht v. Abrahamson, 113 S. Ct. 1710, 
1719 (1993), the Supreme Court reiterated the principle that 
state court convictions should be challenged primarily through 
direct review.  The Court emphasized, as it has before, that the 
Great Writ of habeas corpus is to be reserved for extraordinary 
situations: 
The principle that collateral review is 
different from direct review resounds 
throughout our habeas jurisprudence.  Direct 
review is the principal avenue for 
challenging a conviction.  "When the process 
of direct review . . . comes to an end, a 
presumption of finality and legality attaches 
to the conviction and sentence.  The role of 
federal habeas proceedings, while important 
in assuring that constitutional rights are 
observed, is secondary and limited.  Federal 
courts are not forums in which to relitigate 
state trials." 
 
 In keeping with this distinction, the 
writ of habeas corpus has historically been 
regarded as an extraordinary remedy, "a 
bulwark against convictions that violate 
'fundamental fairness.'"  "Those few who are 
ultimately successful [in obtaining habeas 
relief] are persons whom society has 
grievously wronged and for whom belated 
liberation is little enough compensation." 
Id. at 1719 (citations omitted).   
 Significantly, the Court also noted that "it hardly 
bears repeating that 'an error that may justify reversal on 
direct appeal will not necessarily support a collateral attack on 
a final judgment,'"  Id. at 1720 (internal citations omitted), 
and that "'[l]iberal allowance of the writ . . . degrades the 
33 
prominence of the trial itself' and at the same time encourages 
habeas petitioners to relitigate their claims on collateral 
review,"  Id. at 1720-21 (citation omitted).    
 In this case, the majority "ha[s] no difficulty in 
concluding that the evidence before the [state] court would have 
supported a factual finding that strategic decisions were made." 
Maj. typescript op. at 16.  Nonetheless, the majority concludes 
that federal habeas relief is not barred under Fay v. Noia, 372 
U.S. 391 (1963), because counsel's decision was made in a "legal 
landscape in which they could go forward in hope of an acquittal 
by the jury and raise the due process argument in a Rule 35 
proceeding."  Maj. typescript op. at 21.  I respectfully dissent 
because I believe that the extraordinary remedy of habeas corpus 
is not meant to grant relief to someone who deliberately and 
strategically declined the opportunity to assert his rights 
during his state trial and direct appeal. 
 
I. 
 Although the majority "assume[s] arguendo" that Fay 
"retains independent vitality" subsequent to the Supreme Court's 
decisions in Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977), Murray v. 
Carrier, 477 U.S. 478 (1986), and Coleman v. Thompson, 111 S. Ct. 
2546 (1991), it does so only grudgingly, stating that there is 
"substantial support" for the view that Sykes' "independent and 
adequate state law ground" has "subsumed the 'deliberate bypass' 
rule of Fay."  Maj. typescript op. at 11.  Because the viability 
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of Fay underlies my approach to this case, I discuss it 
notwithstanding the majority's concession.   
 One of the two principal prongs of the Fay holding was 
that a state procedural default did not constitute a bar to 
federal court review under the federal habeas statutes comparable 
to the bar of direct Supreme Court review effected by an adequate 
and independent state law ground.  The other prong gave 
discretion to the federal courts to deny relief to a petitioner 
who had deliberately bypassed the orderly procedure of the state 
courts and, in so doing, forfeited available state court 
remedies.  See Fay, 372 U.S. at 428-35.   
 Fourteen years later, after gradual erosion of the 
first prong of the Fay rule, the Supreme Court in Sykes 
reinvigorated the independent and adequate state ground basis of 
precluding of federal habeas review because of procedural 
defaults.  Instead of Fay's "deliberate bypass" rule, the Court 
applied the "cause and prejudice" test to procedural defaults. 
The suggestion here by the majority that a procedural default may 
be tested only under the "cause and prejudice" test disregards 
the context in which the Sykes rule replaced that of Fay.   
 It is no surprise that the Court itself has 
characterized the Fay "deliberate bypass" test as a "lower 
standard" than that it adopted under the "cause and prejudice" 
test.  See Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 112 S. Ct. 1715, 1720 (1992). 
See also Sykes, 433 U.S. at 87 (the "cause" and "prejudice" 
standard is "narrower" than the Fay test).  Fay was supplanted 
because the Court was uncomfortable with "an all-inclusive rule 
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rendering state contemporaneous objection rules ineffective to 
bar review of underlying federal claims in federal habeas 
proceedings -- absent a 'knowing waiver' or 'deliberate bypass' 
of the right to so object."  Id. at 85.  In light of that 
background, the principles and purposes behind habeas corpus, the 
policy against relitigation of matters that have been concluded, 
and the Court's recent jurisprudence, it is not likely that the 
Supreme Court would disapprove the continued vitality of the Fay 
"deliberate bypass" test in a situation like the present one 
where this court held the "cause and prejudice" test 
unavailable.0 
II. 
 One of the bases for the current habeas jurisprudence 
is the view expressed in Sykes, over a strong dissent by Justices 
Brennan and Marshall, that the Fay test was not sufficiently 
respectful of the states' interests in their procedural default 
rules.  The Court explained:  
                                                           
0Although the majority accepts without discomfort our holding in 
Reynolds v. Ellingsworth (Reynolds I), 843 F.2d 712, 719 (3d 
Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 960 (1988), I cannot avoid some 
comment on the curious nature of that decision.  As the majority 
notes, the Superior Court of Delaware, affirmed by the Supreme 
Court of Delaware, held that Reynolds had waived his right to 
object to the prosecutor's opening comments and the court's 
failure to sua sponte give a curative instruction because he 
failed to make a contemporaneous objection as required by the 
Delaware Supreme Court's earlier opinion in Conyers v. State, 422 
A.2d 345, 346 (Del. 1980) (per curiam).  Nonetheless, despite the 
fact that in this very case the Delaware Supreme Court 
acknowledged that Conyers had enunciated such a rule, this court 
held that the absence of a governing "specific Delaware 
procedural rule" precluded our finding that Conyers constituted 
an adequate and independent state procedural ground supporting 
default.  
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 We think that the rule of Fay v. Noia, 
broadly stated, may encourage "sandbagging" 
on the part of defense lawyers, who may take 
their chances on a verdict of not guilty in a 
state trial court with the intent to raise 
their constitutional claims in a federal 
habeas court if their initial gamble does not 
pay off. 
433 U. S. at 89.   
 The Court again stressed the significance of state 
procedural rules in Keeney, 112 S. Ct. at 1720, where it held 
that the "cause and prejudice" test was applicable to a 
petitioner's negligent failure to develop material facts in the 
state court proceeding.  The Court noted that "[i]n Wainwright v. 
Sykes, we rejected the application of Fay's standard of 'knowing 
waiver' or 'deliberate bypass' to excuse a petitioner's failure 
to comply with a state contemporaneous-objection rule, stating 
that the state rule deserved more respect than the Fay standard 
accorded it."   Id. at 1718 (citation omitted).  The Court 
referred to its decision the year before in Coleman v. Thompson, 
111 S. Ct. 2546 (1991), where "we described Fay as based on a 
conception of federal/state relations that undervalued the 
importance of state procedural rules."  Keeney, 112 S. Ct. at 
1718-19.  In Coleman, the Court had stated: 
The cause and prejudice standard in federal 
habeas evinces far greater respect for state 
procedural rules than does the deliberate 
bypass standard of Fay.  These incompatible 
rules are based on very different conceptions 
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of comity and of the importance of finality 
in state criminal litigation. 
111 S. Ct. at 2563.   
 A fortiori, habeas impinges at the very heart of 
federalism principles.  The majority opinion's view that the 
federalism concerns that underlie Sykes' and Fay's default rules 
do not exist when there is no "independent and adequate" state 
procedural bar is belied by the Court's holding in McClesky v. 
Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 493 (1991).  Even though there had been no 
state procedural default because the case arose in the context of 
the abuse of writ doctrine (which can be viewed as a default in a 
prior federal habeas petition), the Court recognized that 
federalism concerns are still implicated.  It commented that "the 
doctrines of procedural default and abuse of the writ are both 
designed to lessen the injury to a State that results through 
reexamination of a state conviction on a ground that the State 
did not have the opportunity to address at a prior, appropriate 
time; and both doctrines seek to vindicate the State's interest 
in the finality of its criminal judgments."  Id. 
 Admittedly in this case there may not have been a 
concerted effort to bypass all state review in favor of federal 
court review, but federalism, although an important rationale for 
habeas jurisprudence, is not the only consideration.  The 
emphasis in McClesky on the significance of finality of criminal 
convictions ("Without finality, the criminal law is deprived of 
much of its deterrent effect."  Id. at 491 (quotations omitted)) 
has been a frequent theme in habeas cases.  See e.g., Keeney, 112 
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S. Ct. at 1718 ("The writ strikes at finality of a state criminal 
conviction, a matter of particular importance in a federal 
system."). 
 Moreover, the procedural default rules, including as 
well the Fay "deliberate bypass" test, are based, in part, on 
equitable principles.  Thus, the holding of Fay "that the federal 
habeas judge may in his discretion deny relief to an applicant 
who has deliberately bypassed the orderly procedure of the state 
courts and in so doing has forfeited his state court remedies" is 
based on the equitable principle that "a suitor's conduct . . . 
may disentitle him to the relief he seeks."  372 U.S. at 438.   
IV. 
 The majority assumes, as indeed it must in light of the 
state court's evidentiary findings, that, in the words of the 
Delaware Supreme Court, "a strategic choice was made" by 
Reynolds' counsel in failing to object.  App. at 10. Nonetheless, 
the majority concludes that despite these findings Reynolds' 
failure to object did not amount to a "deliberate bypass."  Such 
a constrictive approach to "deliberate bypass" is inconsistent 
with the Fay Court's own explanation of what it encompasses: 
The classic definition of waiver enunciated 
in Johnston v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464--"an 
intentional relinquishment or abandonment of 
a known right or privilege"--furnishes the 
controlling standard.  If a habeas applicant, 
after consultation with competent counsel or 
otherwise, understandingly and knowingly 
forewent the privilege of seeking to 
vindicate his federal claims in the state 
courts, whether for strategic, tactical, or 
any other reasons that can fairly be 
described as the deliberate by-passing of 
state procedures, then it is open to the 
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federal court on habeas to deny him all 
relief if the state courts refused to 
entertain his federal claims on the merits.   
Fay, 372 U.S. at 439.0 
 No Supreme Court decision supports the majority's view 
that Reynolds "strategic choices" did not constitute a 
"deliberate bypass" merely because Reynolds could have believed 
that he could bring his claim in a Rule 35 proceeding and 
therefore was not attempting to bypass the state courts.0 Indeed, 
the only court of appeals to have considered the issue decided 
that a strategic decision not to raise an objection constituted a 
deliberate bypass.  In Brownstein v. Director, Illinois Dep't of 
Corrections, 760 F.2d 836 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 858 
(1985), the state court failed to admonish defendant Brownstein 
of his right to a jury trial.  Brownstein knew that he was 
entitled to a jury trial, and could have asked for it but 
                                                           
0Notwithstanding the language of Fay requiring that the bypass be 
personal, and not that of the defendant's attorney, later cases 
have held that a litigant is bound by the conduct of his 
attorney.  See Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443, 451 (1965) 
("[C]ounsel's deliberate choice of the strategy would amount to a 
waiver binding on petitioner and would preclude him from a 
decision on the merits of his federal claim either in the state 
courts or here."); see also McClesky, 499 U.S. at 494 ("Attorney 
error short of ineffective assistance of counsel . . . does not 
constitute cause and will not excuse a procedural default."); 
Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986) ("So long as a 
defendant is represented by counsel whose performance is not 
constitutionally ineffective . . . we discern no inequity in 
requiring him to bear the risk of attorney error that results in 
a procedural default."); see generally Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 
370 U.S. 626, 633-34 (1962) ("Petitioner voluntarily chose this 
attorney as his representative in the action, and he cannot now 
avoid the consequences of the acts or omissions of this freely 
selected agent."). 
0We note in passing that there was no testimony by counsel that 
they had, in fact, adopted the plan hypothesized by the majority.   
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"deliberately chose to have two chances at acquittal," id. at 
843-44, because his counsel believed he could "use the judge's 
omission to secure a new trial should he lose the first time 
around."  Id. at 839.  Despite the fact that there was no    
state court finding of procedural default to which the Sykes 
"cause and prejudice" rule would apply (because the state court 
had erroneously found there had been notice and waiver of a jury 
trial), the federal courts, both district and court of appeals, 
found a deliberate bypass under Fay.  
 The facts are strikingly similar to those here.  In 
Reynolds I the Sykes "cause and prejudice" test was also found 
inapplicable.  The majority's scenario for the strategy of 
counsel is that they, as did counsel in Brownstein, sought two 
chances, a jury acquittal or subsequent new trial.  It follows 
that the reasoning of the Seventh Circuit is of particular 
relevance.  In holding that "[Fay v.] Noia enables us to look 
beyond the state procedural rules themselves," id. at 842, the 
Brownstein court looked to equitable considerations under which 
"'a suitor's conduct in relation to the matter at hand may 
disentitle him to the relief he seeks.'"  Id. (quoting Fay, 372 
U.S. at 438).  The Court thus held that "[i]n our judgment, [Fay 
v.] Noia goes beyond procedural defaults and allows federal 
judges to deny habeas relief whenever the petitioner's strategic 
behavior clearly requires it."  Id.  It continued, "the 
deliberate by-pass standard of [Fay v.] Noia, relying on general 
equitable principles, does not require the by-pass of a 
requirement; the passing by of a mere opportunity may be enough, 
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and in this case is enough, to call that standard into play." Id. 
(emphasis added).  The court thus concluded, "Although 
[Brownstein] did everything state procedural rules required, [he] 
did not do everything he could have; and the reason he did not 
was a strategic one: he wanted the chance of another trial, if he 
lost the first time. . . .  We hold that he is not entitled to 
federal relief."  Id. at 844. 
 The majority, by disapproving the result reached by the 
Seventh Circuit, thus creates a circuit split.  Although it 
purports to find support in Lefkowitz v. Newsome, 420 U.S. 283 
(1975) and County Court of Ulster County v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140 
(1979), neither of those cases is applicable.  In both cases, 
unlike here, the state appellate courts had heard the merits of 
the petitioners' claims notwithstanding the claimed procedural 
defaults.  Both Supreme Court opinions gave that as a significant 
reason why consideration on the merits by a federal court was not 
barred.  See Lefkowitz, 420 U.S. at 292 n.9 ("But the Court also 
held that if the state courts have entertained the federal 
constitutional claims on the merits in a subsequent proceeding, 
notwithstanding the deliberate bypass, the federal courts have no 
discretion to deny the applicant habeas relief to which he is 
otherwise entitled.") (citations omitted). 
   The majority relies on the statement in Allen that "if 
neither the state legislature nor the state courts indicate that 
a federal constitutional claim is barred by some state procedural 
rule, a federal court implies no disrespect for the State by 
entertaining the claim."  Allen, 442 U.S. at 154.  One difficulty 
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with the majority's position is that the state courts did 
indicate that they viewed Reynolds' federal constitutional claim 
as barred by some state procedural rule and refused to hear his 
claim.  The fact that this court did not agree with the state 
courts' interpretation of their own procedural rule, see dissent 
note 1 supra, and held that it was not "adequate and 
independent," Reynolds I, 843 F.2d at 719, does not mean that we 
can pretend that the state courts heard this claim on the merits 
when they did not. 
 It is important to note that notwithstanding the 
majority's skepticism that trial counsel "deliberate bypassed" 
the claim relating to the opening statement in the state trial 
court, the record is clear that appellate counsel made a 
deliberate decision not to raise the issue on direct appeal for 
tactical purposes.  He testified: 
 
 Q. Do you know the reason that was not raised on 
appeal? 
 
 A. The reason it was not raised on appeal was 
because, as far as I am concerned, the better 
grounds for appeal were the interpretation of the 
stipulation regarding the truth serum and also the 
very good ground of the newly-discovered evidence 
when we had the investigating officer saying he 
believed the wrong man had been convicted. 
 
App. at 77.  Thus the case cannot be governed by Lefkowitz and 
Allen, where counsel raised the issue in the state appeals 
courts.  Nor is it like the decision of Noia not to appeal, also 
cited by the majority as governing here.  As Justice Brennan 
noted, had Noia appealed he would have run a substantial risk of 
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electrocution.  Thus, he stated, "under the circumstances [Noia's 
choice] cannot realistically be deemed a merely tactical or 
strategic litigation step."  Fay, 372 U.S. at 440.  On the other 
hand, Justice Brennan continued, "[t]his is not to say that in 
every case where a heavier penalty, even the death penalty, is a 
risk incurred by taking an appeal or otherwise foregoing a 
procedural right, waiver as we have defined it cannot be found. 
Each case must stand on its facts."  Id. 
 Essentially, the "deliberate bypass" by Reynolds' 
counsel of the opportunity to object when it might have had a 
curative effect gave the district court the discretion to decline 
to exercise its habeas jurisdiction, and its decision to do so 
was reasonable.  The Supreme Court has repeatedly warned against 
using habeas to "give litigants incentives to withhold claims for 
manipulative purposes and [] establish disincentives to present 
claims when evidence is fresh."  McClesky, 499 U.S. at 491-92. 
See also Brecht v. Abrahamson, 113 S. Ct. 1710, 1720-21 
("'liberal allowance of the writ . . .' encourages habeas 
petitioners to relitigate their claims on collateral review"); 
Keeney, 112 S. Ct. at 1718 (Habeas review "may give litigants 
incentives to withhold claims for manipulative purposes."). 
 There are powerful reasons to discourage a defendant 
from bypassing opportunities to object during his trial.  As the 
Supreme Court stated in Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 508 
n.3 (1976), a case cited by the majority, "if the defendant has 
an objection, there is an obligation to call the matter to the 
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court's attention so the trial judge will have an opportunity to 
remedy the situation." 
 One of the goals of procedural default rules is to 
encourage full factual development in state court.  See Coleman, 
111 S. Ct. at 2563.  See also Brecht, 113 S. Ct. at 1721 ("state 
courts often occupy a superior vantage point from which to 
evaluate the effect of trial error").  This consideration was 
referred to expressly in Sykes where the Court noted the benefits 
of rules requiring defendants to make their objections during 
trial: 
A contemporaneous objection enables the 
record to be made with respect to the 
constitutional claim when the recollections 
of witnesses are freshest, not years later in 
a federal habeas proceeding.  It enables the 
judge who observed the demeanor of those 
witnesses to make the factual determinations 
necessary for properly deciding the federal 
constitutional question. . . . 
 
 A contemporaneous-objection rule may 
lead to the exclusion of the evidence 
objected to, thereby making a major 
contribution to finality in criminal 
litigation . . . the jury may acquit the 
defendant, and that will be the end of the 
case; or it may nonetheless convict the 
defendant, and he will have one less federal 
constitutional claim to assert in his federal 
habeas petition. . . .  An objection on the 
spot may force the prosecution to take a hard 
look at its hole card. 
433 U.S. at 88-89 (footnote omitted).  
 Perhaps the Court gave the most succinct summary of the 
rationale for its habeas jurisprudence in Sykes where it stated: 
"the state trial on the merits" should be "the 'main event,'. . . 
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rather than a 'tryout on the road' for what will later be the 
determinative federal habeas hearing."  433 U.S. at 90. 
 On remand from this court, the district court made the 
"deliberate bypass" inquiry and found that it was bound by the 
findings of the state evidentiary hearing, which "was by all 
accounts full, fair, and adequate."  Reynolds v. Ellingsworth, 
1992 WL 404453, at *8 (D.Del. Dec. 31, 1992).  Based on those 
findings and the court's review of the record, the court 
concluded that Reynolds' attorneys chose not to object to the 
prosecutor's opening statement, preferring "to gamble that the 
jury would forget the references and eventually find Reynolds not 
guilty in light of the scanty case presented by the State."  Id. 
at *9.  That was "precisely the kind of calculated decision that 
Henry v. Mississippi and related precedent warned against."  Id. 
The court concluded, similar to the holding in Brownstein, that 
"[a] defendant in state court may not, in short, use federal 
habeas proceedings as a hedge against the chance that his or her 
guess with regard to the jury will turn out to be incorrect." Id.  
 I agree with the district court.  Reynolds took his 
chances and he lost.  He engaged in the kind of strategic 
behavior that disentitles him to habeas relief.   
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